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Expert Elicitation: Using the Classical
Model to Validate Experts’ Judgments
Abigail R. Colson* and Roger M. Cooke†
Introduction
Existing data andmodeling tools cannot provide decisionmakers with all of the information
they need to design and implement effective policies andmake optimalmanagement choices.
Thus decision makers often supplement other forms of information with the judgment of
experts. As noted by Morgan and Henrion (1990), if traditional science and statistics cannot
provide all of the inputs needed for a model or policy analysis, decision makers have few
alternatives to asking experts. Incorporating expert judgment is a way to quantify the uncer-
tainty about otherwise unknown parameters, and it can include methods as disparate as
asking a single expert for his or her best guess, informally surveying colleagues, or following
a formalized, documented procedure for obtaining and combining probabilistic judgments.
The third type of method is called expert elicitation.
In the first attempt to standardize the use of expert judgment, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) documented the elicitation process and opened it to scientific review
(U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1975). The NRC uncovered big differences in expert
opinion, raising questions about how to validate and combine information gathered from
experts (Oppenheimer, Little, and Cooke 2016). Since then, the nuclear safety community
has pioneered expert elicitation methods that address the challenges of validating and com-
bining expert judgments, and the techniques have spread to other fields (Cooke 2012), most
recently to assess future economic growth (Puig and Morales-Napoles 2017).
In order to be accepted as scientific data, expert judgmentsmust adhere to the principles of
the scientific process, including accountability, neutrality, fairness, and the ability for em-
pirical control (Cooke 1991), the last of which is possible through validation. Validation of
expert judgments means both that the judgments reflect the beliefs of the expert and that
those beliefs reflect reality. O’Hagan et al. (2006) observe that it is not possible tomeasure the
former, as the only way of knowing the “true” beliefs of experts is through elicitation itself.
Validating that beliefs reflect reality, however, can be measured by comparing elicited judg-
ments to observed data where possible.
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Unfortunately, expert judgments are rarely validated by observing the variables of interest.
Modelers and analysts turn to experts when probabilities of interest are unknown, thus
making it difficult to validate the experts’ judgments against empirical data. Instead, pundits,
blue ribbon panels, and high-level committees ask audiences to trust their judgments based
on the credentials of the experts rather than on the experts’ track records of making accurate
predictions.1
Cooke, Mendel, and Thijs (1988) first proposed an expert judgment technique that scores
the experts according to their performance against empirical data. The use of these perfor-
mance scores for creating and validating combinations of expert judgments is called the
“classical model,” or structured expert judgment (Cooke 1991). The classical model has
been deployed extensively in a range of areas, including investment banking, volcanology,
public health, ecology, and aeronautics. In 2017, a joint report of the National Academies of
Science, Engineering, and Medicine recommended the approach for applications used to
evaluate the social cost of carbon (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and
Medicine 2017).
This article, which is part of a symposium on expert elicitation,2 examines the classical
model of structured expert judgment. In the next section we provide a brief introduction to
expert elicitation. Then we describe the classical model in more detail and review some
alternative approaches for validating and combining experts’ judgments. Next, we present
a case study of the use of the classical model to inform riskmanagement of invasive species in
the U.S. Great Lakes. This is followed by a description of thirty-three applications of the
classicalmodel conducted from2006 throughMarch 2015 and an analysis of the performance
of the experts and different schemes for combining and validating expert judgments. In the
penultimate section we discuss recent developments regarding the out-of-sample validity of
the classical model. We present a summary and conclusions in the final section.
Introduction to Expert Elicitation
Expert elicitation is the process of obtaining probabilistic belief statements from experts
about unknown quantities or parameters.3 Elicited probabilities can supplement other types
of evidence and serve as inputs to economic, decision analytic, and other modeling.
Elicitation involves carefully defining the target questions, writing and pilot testing an elic-
itation protocol, training the experts in subjective probability, conducting the interviews,
providing feedback to the experts, and analyzing and documenting the results.Major reviews
of best practice for eliciting and using expert judgments includeMorgan andHenrion (1990),
Cooke (1991), and O’Hagan et al. (2006), all of which discuss the need to carefully structure
1In some cases, a rigorous and transparent nomination process has beendocumented to demonstrate that the
term “expert” has been appropriately applied (Aspinall and Cooke 2013; Bamber and Aspinall 2013).
Although the University of Pennsylvania’s recent Good Judgment Project, a large-scale geopolitical event
forecasting competition, included some validation of the judgments of participants over a several-year
period (Mellers et al. 2015), only a small minority of practitioners perform validation.
2The other article is Verdolini et al. (2018), which discusses insights from expert elicitations concerning the
prospects for energy technologies.
3Experts can also provide decisionmakers with preferences and other qualitative information. However, our
focus here will be on using experts for quantitative inputs.
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elicitations to properly capture experts’ beliefs and the value of having experts express their
beliefs as probabilities.4
Expert elicitations typically include multiple experts to capture diversity of knowledge,
background, and opinion, but the subsequentmodeling or decision problem often requires a
single probability distribution for a parameter rather than a set of distributions from several
experts. Thus, combining elicited judgments is important. Clemen andWinkler (1999, 2007)
review available methods, which are classified as behavioral—involving group interaction to
arrive at a single consensus distribution—ormathematical—using analytic processes on the
individual expert assessments to yield one combined distribution,without expert interaction.
A common example of a behavioral approach is the Delphi method, which involves multiple
rounds of experts providing their assessments and reasoning, sharing that information with
all of the experts, and then allowing the experts to revise their assessments, hopefully moving
towards consensus (Rowe and Wright 1999).5 Mathematical techniques for aggregating
judgments include axiomatic and Bayesian approaches. Axiomatic methods use simple com-
bination rules to produce a single distribution; examples include the linear and logarithmic
opinion pools. Bayesianmethods are based on likelihood functions. Behavioral methods can
fail to overcome troublesome group dynamics (Cooke 1991). Bayesian methods are difficult
to use in practice, while axiomatic approaches are easier to understand and implement
(Clemen and Winkler 1999). We focus here on axiomatic combination approaches.
Expert judgment is not an appropriate tool for every quantitative question. For example,
Cooke and Goossens (2008) note that expert judgment is not needed when a quantity is
observable, such as the speed of light in a vacuum, and not appropriate when a field does not
have relevant scientific expertise and relatedmeasurements, such as asking about the behavior
of a god. They argue that the ideal target for expert judgment is an issue such as the toxicity of
a new substance in humans, which is measurable in theory but not in practice.6 Expert
judgment is also not needed if there are sufficient historical data and consensus about the
processes for translating that historical data into predictions (Hora 2007). Finally, if an
outcome is highly dependent on behavior, predictive expertise may not exist (Morgan 2014).
Eliciting expert judgments is an involved process, requiring time and effort from both the
analyst(s) and experts. Quantifying uncertainty may not be worthwhile if it has little impact
on the end decision or outcome (Hora 2007). Thus analysts should identify the key potential
uncertainties in a problem area prior to conducting an expert judgment study.
Introduction to the Classical Model
The classical model is an approach for eliciting and mathematically aggregating expert judg-
ments, with validation incorporated as a core feature. Experts quantify their uncertainty for
two types of questions: target questions and calibration questions. The variables of interest are
the target questions, that is, those that cannot be adequately answered with other methods
4Cooke (2015) reviews nonprobabilistic approaches.
5If consensus is not reached after a number of rounds,mathematical aggregation can then be used to produce
a single assessment.
6Related measurements—like the substance’s toxicity in other organisms—may exist, and these could be a
starting point for expert judgments.
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and thus require expert judgment. Experts also assess a set of calibration questions, which are
items from the experts’ field that are uncertain to the experts (i.e., the experts do not know the
true values or do not have the true values readily accessible), but are either known to the
analysts at the time of the elicitation or will be known during the analysis period. Experts are
scored based on their performance on the calibration questions, and their assessments are
weighted (according to their scores) and combined. This performance-based combination is
also scored on the calibration questions. Thus the classical model validates both individual
expert assessments and the performance-based combinations against observed data.
In the remainder of this section we describe the classical model’s approach to eliciting and
validating expert judgments and its scoring mechanisms. We also discuss calibration ques-
tions in more detail.
Eliciting and Validating Judgments
In the classical model, each expert quantifies his or her uncertainty for each calibration
question and variable of interest. This uncertainty quantification could take many forms,
but to ensure comparability over a range of applications, the classical model imposes a
common structure: experts typically state their fifth, fiftieth, and ninety-fifth percentiles
for the estimate of each uncertain item (Cooke 1991; Cooke andGoossens 2008).7The fiftieth
percentile is the median estimate; the expert thinks it is equally likely that the true value for
that item falls above or below the provided value. The fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles create
a ninety percent credible range—the expert believes there is a ninety percent chance that the
true value falls between those bounds. Sometimes the twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth percen-
tiles are elicited as well, forming a fifty percent credible range (Colson and Cooke 2017).
By providing values for specific percentiles, each expert provides a statistical hypothesis.
She says in effect that there is a five percent chance that the true value of the quantity in
question falls beneath the fifth percentile, a fifty percent chance the true value falls beneath the
fiftieth percentile, and a ninety-five percent chance that the true value falls beneath the ninety-
fifth percentile. If she provides assessments for several independent items for which analysts
have actual values, then an analyst can observe how frequently the true values fall in the
expert’s different interpercentile intervals. This provides a mechanism for validation.
To illustrate, if an expert assesses fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles for ten items, she should
expect that one of the ten actual values will fall outside the provided interval. Suppose that
three realizations fall outside this interval. How poor are the expert’s assessments? Assuming
the expert’s probability statements are correct (i.e., there is a ninety percent chance the true
value falls within the ranges given by the expert), the probability of seeing three or more
realizations fall outside the ninety percent credible range is 0.07. This means that if we
“rejected” this expert, we would have a seven percent chance of rejecting a good expert
who had bad luck on these items; 0.07 is the “P-value” at which we would falsely reject the
hypothesis that the expert is statistically accurate. If, instead, four realizations fell outside the
fifth to ninety-fifth percentile intervals, then the P-value drops to 0.01, and if five realizations
fall outside the intervals, the P-value drops again, to 0.002.
7The percentiles elicited are also called quantiles.
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Measuring Statistical Accuracy
The P-value is a measure for assessing the goodness of fit between a statistical hypothesis—in
this case, the expert’s assessments—and the data. The P-value is the cornerstone of validation
in the classical model, and it is referred to as the expert’s statistical accuracy score.8 Statistical
accuracy scores range from 0 to 1, with higher scores being better. The P-value is not used to
accept or reject experts. Rather, the P-value is used because it is a familiar measure of the
degree to which a statistical hypothesis is supported by data.
Measuring Information
In the classicalmodel, statistical accuracy is one characteristic of an expert’s performance. The
second characteristic is how much information is provided in the expert’s assessments. For
example, consider an uncertain quantity that can vary between zero and one (e.g., the pro-
portion of a population that has been exposed to a hazard). A ninety percent credible range
from 0.03 to 0.90 is less informative than a credible range from 0.05 to 0.10. Among statis-
tically accurate assessments, narrower informative assessments are more useful than wide,
uninformative assessments. Thus the classical model assigns each expert an information
score, which is based on the density of the expert’s assessments relative to a background
distribution.9 To illustrate, if Expert A provides a narrower interval for her ninety percent
credible range than Expert B, then Expert A’s assessment is more densely concentrated and
her information score is higher. The information score is scale invariant (i.e., the score does
not depend on the units of the items) and insensitive to a distribution’s tails. For more detail
on the calculation of both the information and statistical accuracy scores, see, e.g., Cooke
(1991), Cooke and Goossens (2008), Koch et al. (2015), and Wittmann et al. (2015).
Combining Experts’ Judgments
The statistical accuracy and information scores aremultiplied to create an expert’s combined
score. Information scores typically vary between experts by a factor of about three in a given
study, whereas statistical accuracy scores vary over several orders of magnitude (Cooke and
Goossens 2008; Colson and Cooke 2017). As a result, the combined score is influenced more
by an expert’s statistical accuracy than by her information. This means that in the overall
combined score an expert cannot overcome poor statistical performance by providing very
narrow credible ranges (and thus having a high information score).
Combined scores serve as the mechanism for producing performance-based weights for
combining the experts’ assessments (Cooke 1991; Cooke and Goossens 2008). In general,
expert weights should be determined according to a strictly proper scoring rule, meaning that
8Statistical accuracy is sometimes also referred to as “calibration” (e.g., Cooke and Goossens 2008; Quigley
et al. 2018). However, this can lead to the mistaken belief that analysts “calibrate” or adjust experts’
assessments in the same way that scientists calibrate their instruments.
9The background distribution is chosen by the analyst, with the standard choice being a uniform (or log-
uniform) distribution that includes the range of values provided by the experts, the actual value for that
question (if an actual value exists), and an overshoot that extends the distribution’s range on either side by
plus andminus ten percent. For each expert and item, a density is fit to the background distribution, which
adds the least information to the background while complying with the experts’ quantile assessments.
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an expert will maximize her expected score if and only if she states her true beliefs (Cooke
1991). The classicalmodel is based on an asymptotic strictly proper scoring rule,10whereby an
optimal cutoff value for statistical accuracy is used.11 Experts with statistical accuracy scores
below the cutoff value receive aweight of zero, whichmeans their assessments are unweighted
in the subsequent combination of the experts’ judgments.
A combination of expert assessments is called a decision maker. The classical model can
produce two types of performance-based decision makers: the global weight decision maker
and the item weight decision maker. The global weight decision maker assigns each expert a
constant weight for all items, based on the experts’ average information score over all cali-
bration questions. The itemweight decisionmaker, however, assigns each expert aweight that
varies for each item, based on the experts’ information scores for that given item. With item
weights, if an expert has statistical accuracy above the cutoff threshold and generally has high
information scores but has a low information score on one question, she will receive less
weight on that question relative to the others.
The performance of these two combined assessments can also be validated based on the
calibration questions. In practice, in the classical model, analysts typically compare one or
both performance-weight (PW)decisionmakers to a combination thatweights all the experts
equally, regardless of their performance. This is known as the equal-weight (EW) decision
maker.
Calibration Questions
In practice, the classical model validates experts’ assessments and scores expert performance
through calibration questions, which are also called seed questions. Calibration questions
serve three purposes in the classical model: they validate expert performance, enable
performance-based expert weighting, and provide a mechanism for evaluating different
combinations of the experts’ assessments (Cooke et al. 2014). Although experts are not
expected to know the precise true values for calibration questions, they are expected to
provide reasoned quantifications of their uncertainty.
Calibration questions should not be general knowledge or almanac-type questions (e.g.,
What is the population of Venice, Italy?), as experts do not perform better on these questions
than nonexperts and an expert’s performance on these types of questions does not predict her
performance on the variables of interest questions in her field (Cooke, Mendel, and Thijs
1988). Source data for calibration questions can include forthcoming reports, unpublished
data sources, or analysis of unique combinations or subgroups of existing data.12
Finding potential calibration questions is a challenge that requires a strong understanding
of the elicitation’s subject matter. Calibration questions should be closely related to the
variables of interest and should reflect the field(s) of the participating experts. Like the
variables of interest, these questions need to be well specified to ensure that the experts
10This means that for large sets of assessments, an expert will maximize her expected score by expressing her
true beliefs.
11For full mathematical details, see Cooke (1991) and the online supplementary materials for Colson and
Cooke (2017).
12Quigley et al. (2018) discuss strategies for identifying calibration questions and include examples from
several elicitation protocols.
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interpret andunderstand the questions similarly. Because the calibration questions enable the
performance-based expert weights, they must be high quality for the study to be credible. If
reviewers or decision makers in the field do not believe that performance on the calibration
questions is an appropriate indicator of ability to assess the variables of interest, then theywill
reject expert weights that are based on those questions.
Alternative Approaches to Aggregating Expert Judgments
The classical model combines experts’ assessments in a linear opinion pool with weights
determined by expert performance, thus incorporating an element of validation. Other types
of weights and combination mechanisms have also been considered, some of which are
reviewed here.
Likelihood-Based and Social Network Weights
Cooke, ElSaadany, and Huang (2008) compared classical model–based performance weights
with two alternative approaches: likelihood-based weights and social network weights. They
state that likelihoodweights should be avoided because they rely on an improper scoring rule:
they reward an expert for overstating her confidence rather than for expressing her true
beliefs. Moreover, they find that the likelihood weight–based combinations do not outper-
form the classical model’s weights in terms of statistical accuracy, information, or even like-
lihood scores. They also find that social network weights, which are based on an expert’s
scientific citations, can result in combined assessments with “unacceptably low” statistical
accuracy. Focusing on citationsmay also restrict the expert pool to include only those experts
with an established track record of publications, and the authors did not find support for such
a restriction.
Peer Weights
Burgman et al. (2011) and Aspinall and Cooke (2013) explored the use of peer weights rather
than performance weights, an idea that dates back to DeGroot (1974). Peer weights sound
compelling: experts in a field are familiar with each other and each other’s work. Thus, if
experts agreed onwhose opinion should receive themostweight, calibration questionswould
not be needed. However, the data from the few studies that examine this approach warn
against it. For example, Aspinall and Cooke (2013) found that peer rankings, in which the
experts rate each other’s expertise, do not correspond well to rankings according to perfor-
mance. In a review of six expert panels, Burgman et al. (2011) found that peer rankings
correlate with the traditional hallmarks of expertise—for example, years of experience and
publication record—but not with actual expert performance. This highlights the need for a
method that emphasizes testing and validation, like the classical model.
Averaging Experts’ Quantiles versus Averaging Distributions
Beyond the use of alternative linear pooling mechanisms, one additional issue that has re-
ceived attention in the recent expert elicitation literature is whether analysts should average
Expert Elicitation: Using the Classical Model to Validate Experts’ Judgments 7
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experts’ quantiles (i.e., the fifth, fiftieth, and ninety-fifth percentiles elicited from the experts)
or the experts’ distributions. Although most approaches—including the classical model—
average distributions, Lichtendahl, Grushka-Cockayne, and Winkler (2013) argue that av-
eraging quantilesmay be the preferred approach because it concentratesmore of the resulting
distribution around the median, thus reducing the alleged problem of wide uncertainty
distributions in combined assessments.13 Although this approach may sound appealing,
we show later that averaging quantiles rather than distributions has substantial performance
costs.
Median versus Mean of Quantiles
Hora et al. (2013) propose an aggregation of expert assessments that takes the median rather
than the mean of the elicited quantiles. They show that this method performs well when
experts are well calibrated and independent, but that mean-based approaches do better when
those assumptions are relaxed.14
ACase Study of the Classical Model
To illustrate how the classical model has been applied and its policy relevance, we examine an
application related to managing invasive species in the U.S. Great Lakes.15 Researchers used
the classicalmodel to investigate the impact of existing invasive species on the economic value
of ecosystem services (Rothlisberger et al. 2012), the possible future ecological impact of an
Asian Carp invasion in the Great Lakes (Wittmann et al. 2015), and the effectiveness of
various strategies to prevent the establishment of Asian carp in the Great Lakes (Wittmann
et al. 2014). In addition, Zhang et al. (2016) use outputs fromWittmann et al. (2015), along
with other data, to further consider the impact of Asian carp in the Great Lakes. Lodge et al.
(2016) discuss other methods that have been used to understand the risks of invasive species,
emphasizing the potential role of expert elicitation in supplementing gaps in empirical data
and existingmodels.We focus here onRothlisberger et al. (2012) to illustrate how the classical
model can be directly applied to environmental policy decisionmaking.More specifically, we
describe the study’s purpose and design, the elicitation process, how the experts performed,
and the study’s results.
Study Background and Setting
Rothlisberger et al. (2012) estimated the economic costs associated with the second wave of
nonindigenous invasive species into the Great Lakes following the opening of the St.
Lawrence Seaway.16 The economic benefits of the seaway are easily quantified as
13Averaging quantiles is the same as harmonically weighting the experts’ densities (Bamber, Aspinall, and
Cooke 2016; Colson and Cooke 2017).
14Later we will examine whether the assumption of well-calibrated experts holds in data from thirty-three
structured expert judgment studies conducted between 2006 and March 2015.
15This work was led by researchers at the University of Notre Dame and funded by the U.S. National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
16The St. Lawrence Seaway is a system of locks, canals, and channels that permit oceangoing vessels to travel
from the Atlantic Ocean to the Great Lakes as far inland as the western end of Lake Superior.
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transportation cost savings. However, the economic costs of degraded ecosystem services are
not directly observable and thus may be discounted or ignored in policy discussions. Expert
elicitation allowed the researchers to conduct a policy thought experiment: whatwould be the
value of ecosystem services in theU.S.Great Lakes region if the St. Lawrence Seawayhadnever
opened and hence there were no shipborne invasive species? This enabled them to calculate
the costs of invasive species without requiring long-term data on the value of ecosystem
services and all of the potential confounding variables before and after the St. Lawrence
Seaway was opened.
The Elicitation
Rothlisberger et al. (2012) considered damages related to four ecosystem services: commer-
cial fishing, sportfishing, wildlife viewing, and raw water usage. The experts were asked to
quantify their uncertainty about these services in the current (i.e., invaded) condition and in a
hypothetical counterfactual (i.e., if shipborne invasive species were not present but all other
factors remained unchanged). The expert estimates were then converted into dollar values,
thus providing an estimate of the economic loss from degraded ecosystem services.
Rothlisberger et al. (2012) identified experts through a review of the relevant scientific
literature and recommendations from other senior researchers in the field. Experts included
academics, consultants, and government scientists whoworkedon issues related to ecosystem
services in the Great Lakes. Nine experts participated, and they assessed thirteen calibration
questions and forty-one variables of interest. Calibration questions asked about the following
ecosystem services in 2006: pounds of commercially landed fish, angler days of sportfishing,
expenditure on sportfishing, participant days of wildlife watching, and costs to raw water
users. True values of these questions were unknown at the time of the elicitations, but the
values were later released in annual reports from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the
U.S. Geological Survey. The variables of interest concerned predictions of the same items in
2025 and estimates of what the values would have been in 2006 and 2025 if shipborne invasive
species had never been introduced into the Great Lakes (i.e., if the St. Lawrence Seaway had
never opened).
Expert and Decision-Maker Performance
Rothlisberger et al. (2012) found that the statistical accuracy of the experts varied over several
orders of magnitude, from 0.45 to 1.2E-9.17 This highlights the importance of external val-
idation of the experts: although all nine experts had extensive subject matter expertise, as
indicated by their positions and professional qualifications, they differed in their ability to
make statistically accurate probabilistic statements quantifying their uncertainty. Assigning
each expert equal weight, regardless of individual performance, produces a decision maker
with a statistical accuracy score of 0.044. Thismeans that the hypothesis that the EWdecision-
maker’s probability statements are statistically accurate given the actual values of the thirteen
calibration questions is below the traditional five percent level for rejecting statistical hy-
potheses. The PW decision maker had a much higher statistical accuracy score (0.928),
17The scores of the individual experts and the EW and PW combinations are presented in Appendix table 1.
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indicating its better statistical performance in assessing the calibration questions. The PW
decision maker assigns positive weight to only two experts (all of the other experts are
unweighted), both of whom displayed good statistical accuracy.
Rothlisberger et al. (2012) found that even though seven of the experts are unweighted in
the PW decision maker, the median estimated impacts from the PW decision maker were
similar to those from the EW decision maker. However, the 90% credible ranges of the EW
decisionmaker were, on average, 34% larger than those of the PWdecisionmaker, indicating
that the performance-weight decision maker was more informative.
Study Results
Based on the PW combination of the experts, Rothlisberger et al. (2012) estimated that the
median annual loss to commercial fishing due to the impact of shipborne invasive species was
$5.3 million. The experts estimated the impact on sportfishing to be greater, but also more
uncertain; the estimated median annual loss was $106 million, but there was a five percent
chance the impact exceeded $800 million. The median annual costs due to the impact of
biofouling (i.e., the accumulation of organisms onunderwater equipment or surfaces) on raw
water usage, aggregated over all U.S. Great Lakes facilities, was estimated to be $27 million.
Rothlisberger et al. (2012) dropped the costs associated with wildlife viewing from the anal-
ysis because the experts’ uncertainty about the impact of invasive species on wildlife viewing
was extremely wide. Thus the total ecosystem service losses were estimated to be $138.3
million annually.
Next Rothlisberger et al. (2012) estimated the cumulative economic loss associated with
these annual impacts. Assuming a three percent discount rate and that the cost of invasive
species over the next fifty years increases at the same rate as it has in the past, they extrapolate
from the structured expert judgment and estimate that over the next fifty years, preventing
future shipborne invasions would avoid more than $1.45 billion in cumulative losses in the
United States from degraded ecosystem services. They also extrapolate from the estimated
annual transportation cost savings associated with the St. Lawrence Seaway (see Taylor and
Roach 2009) and find that the total cumulative transportation savings over fifty years is $1.41
billion. Thus the ecological services losses exceed the transportation savings. Rothlisberger
et al. (2012) find that the most extreme countermeasure to shipborne invasive species in the
Great Lakes—completely closing the St. Lawrence Seaway to oceangoing ships—would not
produce net benefits for forty-nine years. Less extreme (and thusmore realistic) options, such
as deep ocean ballast water exchange, have shorter payback times.
In summary, Rothlisberger et al. (2012) present new information on the present and future
costs of invasive species in theGreat Lakes. Their estimates,which are possible only through the
use of structured expert judgment, allow for a more robust discussion of the different policies
available to control invasive species entering the Great Lakes through the St. Lawrence Seaway.
Applications and Performance of the Classical Model
We next review expert performance in recent applications of the classical model. First, we
describe a dataset of thirty-three applications conducted between 2006 and March 2015.
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Then we analyze the performance of the experts from these studies and compare the perfor-
mance of three different weighting schemes: equal weighting, performance-based weighting
(i.e., the weights produced by the classical model), and harmonic weighting.
Applications of the Classical Model
Cooke and Goossens (2008) compiled, analyzed, and publicly released the forty-five known
applications of the classical model conducted through 2006. These data, which included
studies with numbers of experts ranging from four to seventy-seven and numbers of calibra-
tion questions ranging from five to fifty-five, allowed other researchers to further study the
classicalmodel and consider how to validate and combine expert judgments (see e.g., Clemen
2008; Lin and Bier 2008; Lin and Cheng 2008; Lin and Huang 2012; Eggstaff, Mazzuchi, and
Sarkani 2014). The pre-2006 data, however, include studies from the initial days of the
classical model, before study design and procedures became more standardized. Moreover,
use of the classical model has expanded greatly since 2006, driven in part by applications in
high-visibility journals (e.g., Aspinall 2010; Bamber and Aspinall 2013), thus making the
Cooke and Goossens (2008) dataset very out of date.
We are aware of thirty-three professionally contracted classical model studies that were
performed between 2007 and March 2015.18 All of these studies follow the general process
outlined in a procedures guide for the classical model (Cooke and Goossens 1999) but are
typically better documented than earlier studies. We conducted an analysis of these thirty-
three applications of the classical model using Excalibur (Cooke and Solomatine 1992).19
In these thirty-three studies, 322 experts assessed between seven and seventeen calibration
questions.20 Studies included between four and twenty-one experts, andmost studies had ten
calibration questions (figure 1). More than one-third of the experts assessed ten calibration
questions.
Performance of Experts
Although an expert’s statistical accuracy score depends on the number of calibration questions
assessed, for most experts the number of questions is similar, so we can make a rough com-
parison.We find that only eighty-sevenof the experts have statistical accuracy greater than 0.05,
which means we can reject the hypothesis that the other 233 experts provided statistically
accurate assessments. More than half of the experts have statistical accuracy that is less than
0.005, and about one-third have scores of less than 0.0001 (figure 2). Again, this highlights the
need for validation of expert judgments. Although all of the participants in these studies are
established experts in their respective fields, their knowledge does not necessarily translate into
statistically accurate probabilistic statements about unknown quantities.
18See the online supplementary materials for a list of the thirty-three applications of the Classical Model
conducted between 2006 and March 2015, with references for the study documentation, where available.
19This is a freely available program now maintained by LightTwist Software and available at http://www.
lighttwist.net/wp/excalibur.
20We excluded two experts who did not provide assessments for all the calibration questions in their re-
spective panels. We also excluded one expert from the Koch et al. (2015) study because the expert was not
included in the study’s analysis.
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Although the majority of experts had statistical accuracy scores of less than 0.05, most
studies had at least one statistically accurate expert—that is, an expert with a score greater
than 0.05 (see figure 3). About twenty percent of the studies had no statistically accurate
experts, and one study had twelve accurate experts. Approximately two-thirds of the studies
had two or more statistically accurate experts. These results suggest that identifying the top
Figure 1 The number of experts and calibration questions in the thirty-three studies.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2006–March 2015 study dataset.
Figure 2 Distribution of expert statistical accuracy scores.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2006–March 2015 study dataset.
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experts in each study and relying on their judgments would be better than relying on expert
judgments that have not been validated.
Performance of the Classical Model
As discussed earlier, the classical model identifies the optimal combination of judgments
based on their performance (Cooke 1991; Cooke and Goossens 2008). In this subsection we
will show that the scoring mechanism of the classical model further improves the quality of
the expert data. More specifically, we compare the PW decision maker to the EW decision
maker, which assigns equal weight to all of the experts without considering expert
performance.
ThePWdecisionmaker can bebased on itemweights or global weights (as described earlier).
In either case, theweight for each expert can range fromzero (meaning the expert is unweighted
in the PW decision maker) to one (meaning the expert is the only weighted expert in the PW
decision maker; all other experts in that study are unweighted). The item weights decision
maker gives nonzero weight to only one expert in thirteen of the thirty-three studies, while the
global weights decision maker gives nonzero weight to one expert in fifteen cases. This means
that only the expert with the highest statistical accuracy score in those studies is included in the
PWdecisionmaker; the other experts are all unweighted.This canmean that the classicalmodel
determined that only one of the experts in the study performedwell or,more commonly, it can
indicate that adding another expert’s assessments to those of the best expert does not improve
the overall performance; it just dilutes the assessments of the best expert.
Figure 3 Number of statistically accurate experts per study.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2006–March 2015 study dataset.
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The combined score of the PW decision maker based on global weights is greater than the
combined score of the PWdecisionmaker based on itemweights in only six of the thirty-three
studies. Because itemweights aremore commonly used in practice and typically are the same
as or outperform global weights, unless otherwise specified, in the remainder of this section
the PW decision maker will refer to the item weights decision maker.
Figure 4 compares the statistical accuracy, information, and combined scores of the PW
and EW decision makers for each of the thirty-three studies. In twenty-six of the studies the
statistical accuracy is greater for the PWdecisionmaker than for the EWdecisionmaker. This
pattern is even more pronounced for information and the combined score; the PW decision
maker outperforms the EW decision maker on information in thirty-two studies and on the
combined score in thirty-one studies. These results indicate that performance-based weight-
ing enables us to calculate a combination of the experts’ judgments that is generally at least as
statistically accurate as the equally weighted combination but is much more informative.
Performance of Harmonic Weighting
The classical model averages probability densities. Lichtendahl et al. (2013) argue for a
different approach, which instead averages the experts’ quantiles. This is equivalent to
harmonic weighting (Bamber, Aspinall, and Cooke 2016). Implementing such harmonic
weights without performance-based scoring does not require calibration questions, which
means the elicitation process would be quicker and cheaper than in a full classical model
study. Thus if harmonic weighting improved information relative to equal weighting while
maintaining statistical accuracy, it would be an alluring alternative to performance-based
weighting.
However, figure 5, which compares the performance of the harmonic-weight (HW)
decision maker with the EW and PW decision makers,21 cautions against such an
Figure 4 Statistical accuracy, information, and combined scores of the equal-weight (EW) and
performance-weight (PW) decision maker for each of the thirty-three studies.
Notes: The shaded regions show statistical accuracy of less than 0.05. Each point is a single study and the x¼ y
line is drawn to show whether the score is higher for the EWor PW decision maker in that study.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2006–March 2015 study dataset.
21Note that this HW decision maker, like the EW decision maker, is based on all of the experts’ assessments,
with no element of performance-based weighting.
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approach. Although the HW decision maker is more informative than the EW decision
maker in all studies except one (figure 5, panel A2), its drop in statistical accuracy is
drastic. In fact, the HW decision maker’s statistical accuracy score is less than 0.05 in
eighteen cases (Bamber, Aspinall, and Cooke 2016), less than 0.005 in twelve cases, and
less than 0.0001 in four cases (figure 5, panel A1). In contrast, the lowest observed sta-
tistical accuracy for an EWdecisionmaker is 0.04. Because themagnitude of the difference
in statistical accuracy scores is larger than the difference in information scores, the EW
decision maker has a higher combined score than the HW decision maker in all but ten
studies (figure 5, panel A3). The PW decision maker compares favorably with the HW
decision maker, with its combined score being higher than the HW decision maker’s
combined score in all but three studies (figure 5, panel B3). Thus, although harmonic
weighting does improve information compared to equal weighting, it exacts a very high
price in terms of statistical accuracy. In sum, if the goal of a weighting scheme is to yield
good performance, it is important to measure and verify performance, as is done in the
classical model.
Figure 5 Statistical accuracy, information, and combined scores of the equal-weight (EW), performance-
weight (PW), and harmonic-weight (HW) decision makers for each of the thirty-three studies.
Notes: The shaded regions show statistical accuracy of less than 0.05. Each point is a single study and the x¼ y
line is drawn to show whether the score is higher for the EWor PW decision maker in that study.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2006–March 2015 study dataset.
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Out-of-Sample Validation
The fact that the PW decision maker regularly has higher statistical accuracy, informa-
tion, and combined scores than individual experts or the EWdecisionmaker indicates the
classical model’s in-sample validity. This means that the classical model’s weighting sys-
tem performs well when it is evaluated against the calibration questions (i.e., the same
data used to determine the weights). However, it is important to also examine how the
model performs when it is tested on out-of-sample data. This section reviews recent work
in this area.
Unfortunately, true out-of-sample validation is rarely possible for applications of the
classical model because expert judgment is needed only when there are no data for the
variables of interest. In fact, observations for the variables of interest were collected after the
elicitation for only two of the forty-five cases in the Cooke and Goossens (2008) database,
and none of the studies included in the data presented here have observations for the
variables of interest. Thus, in lieu of evaluating true out-of-sample validity, the research
has focused on techniques for cross validation, whereby a subset of the calibration questions
is used to compute expert weights for a PW decision maker and the PW decision maker’s
performance is evaluated against the remainder of the calibration questions (i.e., the com-
plementary subset). The first subset is called the training set, and the second subset is call the
test set.
A common approach to cross validation is to remove one calibration question at a time,
recalculate the combined scores and PW decision makers, and evaluate the decision
makers’ performance for the removed item (Clemen 2008; Lin and Cheng 2008,
2009).22 In addition to the remove-one-at-a-time technique, researchers have investi-
gated fifty–fifty splits of the calibration questions (Cooke 2008) and seventy–thirty splits
(Flandoli et al. 2011). Eggstaff, Mazzuchi, and Sarkani (2014) take the most comprehen-
sive approach, splitting a study’s calibration question into all possible combinations of
two subsets. This idea has also been applied in recent applications, which look at the data
from an individual study (Cooke et al. 2014; Koch et al. 2015), but knowing how best to
categorize a study’s out-of-sample validity based on this procedure is difficult. Small
training sets make it difficult to resolve differences in the statistical accuracy of the
experts, and small test sets make it difficult to resolve differences between the EW and
PWdecisionmakers (Cooke 2014; Cooke et al. 2014). Colson and Cooke (2017) propose a
summary measure that balances these issues and find that the PW decision maker out-
performs the EW decision maker out of sample in twenty-six of the thirty-three 2006 to
March 2015 studies. They also find that out-of-sample performance is correlated with the
best and second-best experts’ statistical accuracy scores but not with study characteristics
that are easily within an analyst’s control.23
22However, Cooke (2008, 2012a) noted that this procedure compounds the errors of increasing the weight of
experts who assess the removed items badly, which results in significant bias.
23Colson and Cooke (2017) find that out-of-sample performance is not correlated with study characteristics
such as the number of experts or calibration questions, whether the elicitations were done one on one or in
plenary sessions, or whether three or five quantiles were elicited (typically the five, fifty, and ninety-five
percentiles or the five, twenty-five, fifty, seventy-five, and ninety-five percentiles).
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This recentwork on the classicalmodel’s out-of-sample performance further demonstrates
the validity of performance-basedweighting of experts. Futurework related to out-of-sample
validation could be used to improve our understanding of the robustness of the results from a
single study or to improve elicitation design.
Conclusions
Expert judgment plays an important (and unavoidable) role in risk management, uncer-
tainty analysis, and decision making. Fortunately, techniques exist for collecting and val-
idating expert judgments in a structured and scientifically sound manner. The classical
model is one approach for validating and combining expert judgments, and it has been
applied in more than one hundred expert panels to date, including the thirty-three single-
panel applications conducted between 2006 and 2015 that we have discussed here. We have
shown that the classical model’s scoring system can identify the experts that are best able to
quantify their uncertainty with meaningful probabilistic statements. Weighting the experts
according to performance produces decision makers that consistently outperform combi-
nations based on equal and harmonicweights in the thirty-three studies. Thus, for decisions
or policies with a large potential impact on society, we would argue that the classical model
and its validated assessments are the best tool for incorporating expert judgments when
they are needed.
The classicalmodel has been applied in a number of disciplines, but, aswe have discussed, it
is not appropriate in all circumstances. Even when expert judgment is needed, aggregating
individual expert assessments into a single distribution may not be best in every application
(Morgan 2014). More generally, expert judgment should not provide the final word on any
issue; rather, it should guide future data collection, modeling, and analysis related to the
topic.
Almost all of the thirty-three structured expert judgment studies were conducted in-
person, either in one-on-one interviews or in plenary sessions. Recent World Health
Organization elicitations, which we have not included here because they consist of a large
number of overlapping expert panels, were conducted via remote elicitation (Aspinall et al.
2016). The experts in those panels did not perform aswell as the experts in the panels reported
here. This could be due to the remote elicitation. Thus, further work is needed to develop
robust remote elicitation tools and to ensure that expert performance does not systematically
decline with remote elicitation. Remote tools will make it easier to elicit, validate, and com-
bine expert knowledge from around the world, potentially on an even larger scale than is
currently done with the classical model.
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Abstract
The inclusion of expert judgments along with other forms of data in science,
engineering, and decision making is inevitable. Expert elicitation refers to formal
procedures for obtaining and combining expert judgments. Expert elicitation is
required when existing data and models cannot provide needed information. This
makes validating expert judgments a challenge because they are used when other
data do not exist and thus measuring their accuracy is difficult. This article exam-
ines the classical model of structured expert judgment, which is an elicitation
method that includes validation of the experts’ assessments against empirical
data. In the classical model, experts assess both the unknown target questions
and a set of calibration questions, which are items from the experts’ field that
have observed true values. The classical model scores experts on their performance
in assessing the calibration questions and then produces performance-weighted
combinations of the experts. From 2006 through March 2015, the classical model
has been used in thirty-three unique applications. Less than one-third of the indi-
vidual experts in these studies were statistically accurate, highlighting the need for
validation.Overall, the performance-based combination of experts produced in the
classical model is more statistically accurate and more informative than an equal
weighting of experts. (JEL: C18, C19, C89)
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